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Abstract
The central purpose of  this paper is to explore the dynamic relationship between 
Javanese strongmen and religious leaders in search of  power. Two groups of  
strongmen—jago in Central and East Java and jawara in Banten—and 
religious leaders, such as kyai, tarekat teachers and guru ngaji are the subjects 
of  this discussion. I present two groups of  strongmen and religious leaders 
and sketch how both groups, through their socio-political as well as religious 
roles, preserve the values of  the Javanese and Bantenese. Religious leaders and 
strongmen have been the source of  informal traditional leadership, particularly 
in villages. Religious leaders have represented leadership in knowledge, while 
strongmen have represented leadership with regard to braveness and physical-
magical power. The most visible roles of  the strongmen are as power brokers. In 
the meantime, religious leaders have to be aware of  the risk of  being alienated 
and isolated from their horizontal networks within religious circles, but also 
more importantly, that their high position in society will gradually fade away 
if  they place themselves too close to strongmen and the authorities. 
Keywords: Jago, jawara, kyai, power relations
A. Introduction
Rural people in Indonesia are vulnerable. In Java, during the Dutch 
colonial period, there was enough population pressure to keep incomes 
Yanwar Pribadi
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2011 M/1432 H160
low and underemployment common. People in the countryside were 
poorly connected with each other. During this time when emigration was 
difficult and the protection of  the central state uncertain, rural inhabitants 
remained eminently vulnerable. At this time, banditry was rampant and 
strongmen took advantage of  weak law enforcement, challenging the 
reputation of  the island as a place of  safety. Moreover, it was the colonial 
authority that to a large extent provided criminals with opportunities to 
maintain their power.1
Strongmen have been widely associated with bandits2 , violent 
entrepreneurs3, or revolutionaries.4 In the Indonesian case, there have 
been several studies of  these sturdy and muscular-stereotyped people 
who are represented as bandits5, village leaders6, intermediaries7, rebels8 
or local heroes, as well as power brokers, criminals and people who 
possessed magical power.9
Meanwhile, a strict distinction between the term ulama and kyai 
does not appear here. According to Noer, the term kyai might indicate 
1 Henk Schulte Nordholt, “The Jago in the Shadow: Crime and ‘Order’ in the 
Colonial State in Java,” RIMA, Vol. 25/1, Winter 1991, pp. 74-91; Henk Schulte Nor-
dholt, “A Genealogy of  Violence,” in Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (eds.), 
Roots of  Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective (Leiden: KITLV 
Press, 2002), pp. 33-61; and Henk Schulte Nordholt and Margreet van Till, “Colonial 
Criminals in Java, 1870-1910,” in Vicente L. Rafael (ed.), Figures of  Criminality in Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Colonial Vietnam (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1999).  
2 Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits (New York: Delacorte Press, 1969).
3 Anton Blok, The Mafia of  a Sicilian Village 1860-1960: A Study of  Violent Peasant 
Entrepreneurs (Oxford: Polity Press, 1988).
4 John S. Koliopoulos, Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern 
Greece 1821-1912 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
5 Suhartono, Bandit-bandit Pedesaan: Studi Historis 1850-1942 di Jawa (Yogyakarta: 
Aditya Media, 1995).
6 Onghokham, “The Inscrutable and the Paranoid: An Investigation into the 
Sources of  the Brotodiningrat Affair,” in Ruth McVey (ed.), Southeast Asian Transitions: 
Approaches through Social History (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978), 
pp. 112-157. 
7 Onghokham, “The Jago in Colonial Java, Ambivalent Champion of  the People,” 
in Andrew Turton and Shigeharu Tanabe (eds.), Histroy and Peasant Consciousness in South 
East Asia (Osaka: National Museum of  Ethnology, 1984), pp. 327-343.
8 Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People`s Militia and the Indo-
nesian Revolution 1945-1949 (North Sydney: Asian Studies Association of  Australia, 1991).
9 Henk Schulte Nordholt, “The Jago in the Shadow”..
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two kinds of  persons. The first comprises those whose knowledge of  
Islam surpasses that of  the ordinary men and typically devote themselves 
to teaching. The second type is more closely related to dukun (magicians/
shamans/medicine men/healer) who teach mystical and secret doctrines 
and practice all kinds of  medicine.10 Horikoshi distinguishes the terms 
kyai and ulama. For Horikoshi the difference lies primarily in the more 
extensive charisma that a kyai possesses. The ulama play more of  a role 
in the social system and the social structure of  villages with their ultimate 
status legitimized by hereditary factors. Among the people, the kyai is 
higher than the village ulama and their presence is regarded as a unifying 
symbol in society since their moral and spiritual leadership is not tied 
to the normative structure of  the village.11 In Madura the term kyai also 
signifies leadership in other realms. In the broader context the term ulama 
refers to men of  Islamic learning and Islamic religious leaders in general. 
Hence, I use both terms, ulama and kyai interchangeably.
Exploring the dynamic relationship between Javanese strongmen 
and religious leaders in search of  power is the purpose of  this paper. 
Two groups of  strongmen—jago in Central and East Java and jawara in 
Banten—and religious leaders, such as kyai, tarekat (mysticism) teachers 
and guru ngaji are the subjects of  my discussion. In addition, tracing the 
historical roots of  strongmen in Indonesia and their deeds is also one 
of  the aims of  this paper in order to raise our understanding of  their 
nature, while discussions on religious leaders are not stressed here. In 
the following pages we will encounter jago and jawara who have also been 
considered as types of  social protest and rebellion.
B. Jago: Master of  the Underworld
Jago are undoubtedly the most notorious and discussed strongmen 
in the literature. A significant number of  studies have examined jago as 
interested in violence, protest movements, and acting as power brokers 
or simply criminals in colonial Java, the Netherlands East Indies or 
Indonesia. While the term may offer a common identity for scholars 
working on subjects ranging from history, anthropology or sociology, it 
10 Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973).
11 Hiroko Horikoshi, Kyai dan Perubahan Sosial (Jakarta: P3M, 1987).
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can also invoke a sense of  anxiety from scholars of  criminology, politics 
and area studies. It is not only that the term may be vague, but also 
that it can be abused. Since the term jago has been widely used and also 
mistreated, I am also concerned with how the term has been embedded 
and perceived in the literature dealing with subjects I have mentioned.
Jago literally means cock or fighting cock. The use of  the word 
‘jago’ does not always have negative connotations. In the contemporary 
period, one, for instance, can refer to a mathematician as ‘jago matematika’, 
although certainly to identify an infamous thug who commits crimes, one 
may use ‘jagoan’ (tough men). Though jago were notorious in colonial Java, 
almost every region had its own word to identify such figures, such as 
brengseng in Banyumas; warok in Ponorogo; bromocorah in Kediri; bangkrengan 
or gento in Tegal; lenggaong in Pemalang; jawara in Banten, Batavia and West 
Java; or pendekar as the most popular names. Lucas mentions:
“A lenggaong does not necessarily steal in the way an ordinary thief  does. 
A lenggaong is a person who has physical strength, and deep spiritual 
knowledge. It takes a long time to become a lenggaong, studying self-defence 
arts (silat) and obtaining knowledge of  inner things (ilmu-ilmu dalam). If  a 
person has the title lenggaong, his livelihood does not come from stealing, 
but from other people who need the security of  the protection that he 
can give…In colonial times the lenggaong were in general looked up to 
(disegani) by the people. Their actions did not bother the people. It was 
the colonial administration and the landlords who were obstructed.”12
The historical roots of  the jago lie in the pre-colonial period, during 
the time of  royal wars and periods of  violence in Javanese history.13 Their 
new roles, however, emerged and peaked during the colonial period.
Jago only existed in central and east Java. Similar groups in other 
regions definitely existed. Nonetheless, they had particular names. Some 
scholars have incorrectly addressed similar groups as jago. For instance, 
in Greater Jakarta area, the term jawara was used, instead of  jago.14 Jago 
12 Anthony Edward Lucas, “The Bamboo Spear Pierces the Payung: The Revolu-
tion against the Bureaucratic Elite in North Central Java in 1945,” PhD thesis (Canberra: 
Australian National University, 1981).
13 Onghokham, “The Jago in Colonial Java”, pp. 335-336.
14 John R. W. Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-1946: A Study in the Social 
History of  the Indonesian Revolution (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 
1964); Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries; and Margreet van Till, “In Search of  
Strongmen and Religious Leaders in Java
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2011 M/1432 H 163
were more than simple rural criminals,15 they were known mostly for 
their role as power brokers. The term jago is also frequently confused 
with jagoan.16 Indonesians may call present strongmen as jagoan, instead 
of  jago. Jago is an adjective or noun to identify someone as being tough 
(in fighting) or smart (in science), for instance. Groups or an individual 
who act like jago are mostly called jagoan. This term has both positive 
and negative connotations. Although it seems unimportant, identifying 
a particular group with other names may be misleading and may lead to 
misunderstanding. Therefore, what I discuss here is the jago groups who 
roamed and settled in colonial Java.
In East Java jago found a comfortable haven, often acting as 
power brokers. They were also known as palang, kebayan, weri or blater. 
They were usually leaders of  a peer group. Occasionally, a palang could 
surpass the charisma of  a village headman. This charisma also extended 
to the population at large as well.17 Palang, however, did not enjoy their 
time of  power for a long time. When the colonial administration ended 
Cultuurstelsel (Cultivation system) in 1870, the authorities removed palang 
from their previous function as agents for corvee labour. The function 
was replaced by weri who were employed by the Dutch administration to 
provide information to them. Weri thus acted as spies giving information 
about what was happening in villages. For the villagers, weri were called 
blater and this group numbered around 4.000 to 5.000 at the beginning 
of  the twentieth century only in Madiun residency.18
Jago in their simplest form could also be criminals. Bands of  
robbers usually were led by a strong and sakti (posses magical power) 
boss. This headman formed a underworld network with other leaders 
of  the similar groups. The networks as well as the bands were relatively 
loose in structure with individuals centred around a leader. The followers 
were hardly considered jago since there was only one ‘jagoan’ in a gang 
Si Pitung: the History of  an Indonesian Legend,” in BKI 152, No. 3, 1996, pp. 461-482.
15 John R. W. Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution, p. 88.
16 Nico Schulte Nordholt, “Violence and the Anarchy of  the Modern Indonesian 
State,” in Frans Hüsken and Huub de Jonge (eds.), Violence and Vengeance: Discontent and 
Conflict in New Order Indonesia (Saarbrücken: Verlag für Entwicklungspolitik Saarbrücken, 
2002), pp. 53-54.
17 Onghokham, “The Inscrutable and the Paranoid”, p. 74.
18 Ibid, pp. 74-75.
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though networks of  jago were structurally common. These individuals 
or anak buah (underlings) could move to other gangs and took an oath 
to be faithful and serve their new leader if  the old gang was disbanded 
or the leader was captured or if  they were convinced that the new 
group could provide them with more opportunities. Patronage was 
thus exceptionally evident within these bands. The leader preserved 
his position by dispensing material rewards to leading members of  the 
group. Personal links between anak buah and the leader could exist and 
were characterised by a large degree of  dependencies on the assistance 
of  the leader to the anak buah.
Like the notorious bandit Pitung in Batavia, jago were not righteous 
thugs. Jago, when they committed crimes with their bands, did not rob 
from the well-off  and distribute the booty to the unfortunate. Farmers 
or peasants in general, were easy prey for criminal bands. Cattle rustlings 
were quite common in Pasuruan, for instance. In 1909 there were 1382 
cattle rustlings, while the number dropped off  to 778 in 1914, 189 in 1919 
and only 63 in 1924.19 The number continuously declined for one main 
reason. Sugarcane (tebu) estates were introduced by Chinese landlords 
who had leased the land from various regents since the last decade of  
eighteenth century. One of  these Chinese entrepreneurs was Han Kik 
Ko (1766-1813), the fifth son of  Captain Han Bwee Kong whose estate 
around 1808 was including twelve villages and 2.538 persons.20 During the 
heyday of  the estates, a considerable number of  people earned money by 
renting their cattle-carts to the estates as their means of  livelihood. The 
abundance of  cattle attracted bands of  robbers to operate in Pasuruan. 
The development of  transportation at the beginning of  the twentieth 
century, however, reduced the significance of  cattle-carts. Consequently, 
cattle rustlings became less common.21
In another form of  crime, jago might commit various kinds of  
extortion. Even though fairly loose in structure, the jago bands had their 
own territory with a hierarchy of  leaders and sponsors and characterized 
by a distinct specialization of  functions. Meetings in amusement centres, 
such as opium dens, prostitution quarters or simply warung (food stalls) 
19 Suhartono, Bandit-bandit Pedesaan, p. 148.
20 Claudine Salmon, “The Han Family of  East Java: Entrepreneurship and 
Politics (18th-19th Centuries),” Archipel, Volume 41, 1991. pp. 53-87.
21 Suhartono, Bandit-bandit Pedesaan, p. 147-148.
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served as the occasion for discussing their plans. They arranged operations 
of  extortion. Jago were aware that the colonial authority was unable to 
penetrate into the lowest level of  administration, the village. Daendels 
had created a centralistic government. All government affairs were 
arranged from Batavia. The colonial government based the administrative 
mechanism on a Western model, placing sultans and their families under 
the Dutch colonial government, and converting them into bureaucrats. 
Daendels’s purpose was to run the government under direct rule, so that 
he could rule the people without the local rulers as intermediary. However, 
the effect of  this policy was not great. After the Daendels era, or more 
precisely after the Java war, the Dutch colonial government seemed to 
look back to indigenous people to run lower administrative areas where 
the indigenous administrative system relied on personal relations. The 
village became the lowest administrative unit, and was headed by a chief  
paid with a plot of  village land. During this so-called indirect rule, jago 
offered “protection” to a certain village. As a result, the village was safe 
from cattle rustlings or ordinary robberies. This protection was not free 
and indicates the most notorious form of  extortion committed by jago.
As extortionists, jago also committed the crime in more soft and 
elegant ways. They would not undertake any misdeeds in a certain village 
and in fact would “protect” the neighbourhood against robberies. This 
offer once again was not for free. In exchange, they received exemption 
from taxes. For being guardians, they were admired by the people.22 Not 
surprisingly, since they knew many of  these defenceless elements of  
villagers, a number of  jago could manage to become village heads by 
utilizing their role as the village guardians. Consequently, those villages 
were controlled by generations of  jago who benefitted from the situation.23
Jago also acted as power brokers or intermediaries for there were 
increasing demands for such persons at all levels of  society. Intermediaries 
appeared between cultural ideals and the political realities of  governing 
a society, bridging an ideological gap. The aristocracy’s ideal, and the 
ideal of  all formal power holders in Java, was one of  a symbolic centre, 
protective, passive and aloof  from day-to-day affairs. Javanese ideology 
presented the noblemen as a parasitical but rather harmless class. Just 
22 Henk Schulte Nordholt, “The Jago in the Shadow”, p. 82.
23 Ibid, p. 84.
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as the demands of  the Dutch and the aristocracies could not be fulfilled 
without active intermediaries, as they lacked personnel, the peasantry 
also saw a need for more active leadership in order to link them with 
the outer world. This was found in the jago. Relative distance from the 
formal focus of  power gave intermediaries less need for charisma, and 
more scope for direct action.24 An intermediary is well illustrated in 
Groneman`s Een Kètjoegeschiedenis.25 Another figure is portrayed not only, 
for instance, as being wealthier than a village head, but also as more 
than an ordinary thief. He is fully aware of  what he is doing since he is 
respected by the villagers.26
When they acted as brokers, jago normally operated against 
the population and they succeeded in spreading fear among the local 
inhabitants in colonial Java.27 Regents in Java had to come to an agreement 
with jago in their territory. As a result, jago in this way became the spies of  
the regents in their area and they would not be afraid to accept the role 
of  the strong arm of  the law.28 Jago were almost always useful as spies 
and collaborators of  regents. Therefore, they succeeded in remaining 
beyond the reach of  European administration and creating their own 
power base in the shadow of  the colonial state.29
The colonial administration was concerned with the increasing 
roles of  the jago. Batavia, for instance sent Snouck Hurgronje to Madiun 
to investigate a case involving the regent, Brotodiningrat. Snouck found 
several leaders of  the jago, among them kyai and dukun. According 
to Snouck all these prominent jago had the reputation of  being kebal 
(invulnerable) and taught others the means to achieve invulnerability. 
Although it would be hard to prove their involvement in any subversive 
designs of  the regent of  Madiun, or of  any crime, Snouck advised the 
government to exile the most prominent jago. According to Snouck they 
had the reputation of  being fearless even against higher Dutch authority 
and being kebal against bullets and sharp weapons. If  the Netherlands 
East Indies government did not take measures against them, then their 
24 Onghokham, “The Jago in Colonial Java”, p. 337.
25 Isaac Groneman, Een Kètjoegeschiedenis (Dordrecht: J.P. Revers, 1887).
26 Boeka (P.C.C. Hansen Jr.), Pàh Troeno (Amsterdam: F van Rossen, 1901).
27 Henk Schulte Nordholt, A Genealogy of  Violence, pp. 39-40.
28 Henk Schulte Nordholt, The Jago in the Shadow, p. 78.
29 Ibid, p. 85
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reputation of  being magically invulnerable would be enhanced and lead 
to more unrest.30
A Jago often gained his reputation from the fear he inspired in the 
local inhabitants. Once he had proven his power, people would not dare 
to oppose his nasty reputation. The official local rulers were aware of  this 
situation. For them jago were the prime instrument to reinforce their grip 
on their district. Thus, besides the official hierarchy of  local rulers, an 
indispensable informal circuit operated, in which jago operated as agent 
for the higher authorities.31 Furthermore, even though officially jago were 
considered to have played only a minor role, in reality they engaged in a 
more significant role at the center of  local life, utilizing the space provided 
by the central government and filling it with violence. Local violence was 
part of  an almost steady tradition in Java since, until recently, no central 
administration had the power to control society completely.32
C. Jawara: Feared and Admired Champions33
Perhaps the most influential strongmen group in the socio-political 
world of  Indonesia is jawara. The New Order regime provided them 
with opportunities to expand themselves into socio-political realms. 
Era Reformasi, often characterized by social instability and insecurity, 
even has placed the position of  this group on a firm basis. Jawara have 
long entrenched themselves in Bantenese society. Like jago, the roots 
can be traced back to the colonial era. Unlike jago, however, jawara have 
strengthened their position in society.
Throughout history, jawara in Banten played many roles, from 
their mythical origins as bodyguards of  kings and ulama, to instigators 
of  rebellions, to their mobilisation as security personnel for political 
parties and the ruling elite. Kartodirdjo argued that the jawara consisted 
largely of  people without permanent occupation who were often engaged 
30 Onghokham, “The Jago in Colonial Java”, p. 328.
31 Henk Schulte Nordholt, The Jago in the Shadow, p. 77.
32 Ibid.
33 Some parts of  this section appear in my MA Thesis. See Yanwar Pribadi, 
“Jawara in Banten: Their Socio-Political Roles in the New Order Era 1966-1998,” MA 
Thesis (Leiden: Leiden University, 2008).
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in criminal activities.34 A report from a Dutch resident, Craemer, in 
his memorie van overgave of  1930s, told us that jawara originally evolved 
from orok lanjang, a youth organization in the district of  Menes. This 
organization then developed, spreading outside Menes and becoming 
known for providing bodyguards and being involved in fighting and 
stirring up trouble.35
The emergence of  jawara was not a result of  oppression and 
grinding poverty in Banten. Though they may have joined in spontaneous 
food riots, or may have committed criminal acts, people facing starvation 
are too busy just surviving to plot the overthrow of  government or to 
formulate a blueprint for an alternative social order.36 The emergence 
of  the jawara supports this proposition as well as the assertion that the 
potential for violent social protest corresponds to relative rather than 
absolute deprivation. Jawara groups who were considered to be bandits 
were reduced to starvation or to total impoverishment, suffering a 
significant decline in their social standing and economic well-being.
Moreover, their relationship with the rural population was 
ambiguous, as can be seen in the ambiguity of  the jawara figure in folk 
etymology - which can also be considered to be an abbreviation - with 
words like jahat (evil), wani (brave), rampog (robber) and jago (champion), 
wani, (brave), and ramah (friendly). Else Ensering classified jawara into 
two groups: the jawara-teri, refering to petty thieves and robbers, and 
the jawara-gedeh, who practiced pencak silat, used weapons, and pursued 
mystical development under the guidance of  a kyai, culminating in the 
34 Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants’ Revolt of  Banten in 1888, Its Conditions, 
Course, and Sequel: A Case Study of  Social Movements in Indonesia (`s-Gravenhage: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1966).
35 Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Memori Serah Jabatan 1931-1940 Jawa 
Barat (I) (Jakarta: Penerbitan Sumber-sumber Sejarah No. 11, 1980). Furthermore, 
Williams stated that this organization was originally a mutual aid society which had 
its own administration, treasurer and local branches. Some branches had their own 
president and secretary with members paying monthly contributions. See Michael C. 
Williams, Communism, Religion and Revolt in Banten (Athens: Ohio University Center for 
International Studies, 1990), p. 281.
36 E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of  Social Movement in 
the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York: Norton, 1965), p. 79.
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attainment of  invulnerability.37
Long after Indonesian independence, the patron-client relationship 
in Banten in the New Order Era perhaps was best identified in the ties 
between the state and jawara. Throughout history, jawara had always 
worked individually or in small bands. While there were informal networks 
of  individual jawara, usually based upon allegiances and loyalties to 
particular ulama, there had never been a formal structured organization. 
Satkar Pendekar, renamed Persatuan Pendekar Persilatan dan Seni Budaya 
Banten Indonesia/PPPSBBI (the Indonesian Association of  Bantenese 
Men of  Martial Arts, Art and Culture), was established as a forum for 
jawara and martial arts schools throughout Banten as well as in Jakarta. 
From its inception PPPSBBI identified “nation and state” with Golkar, 
with whom they had had a close relationship starting with the 1977 
general election. It was largely due to the influence of  Tubagus Chasan 
Sochib who, from the early 1970s, was a local parliamentarian for the 
Golkar faction, and certainly a prominent figure in the jawara community.38
Tubagus Chasan Sochib is unquestionably the most influential 
and renowned, as well as notorious, jawara in Banten at the moment. 
As an old man, people may assume that he is an ordinary veteran. He is 
indeed a veteran in the jawara world, entrepreneurship and a veteran in 
the sense that he comes from Generation 45, a revolutionary generation 
that struggled in Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949. Ratu Atut Chosiyah, 
the present governor of  Banten Province is one of  his daughters.
Sochib was born in Serang in 1930. He has three brothers, Tubagus 
Basuni, Tubagus Syatibi and Entus Sibli, and one sister, Ojah Faojah. They 
are all children of  Tubagus Sochib and Nyi Ratu Rofiah. He attended 
several pesantren (Islamic boarding school) during his childhood. Of  the 
pesantrens, the Pesantren Pani`is in Jiput, Pandeglang was his first boarding 
school. He was entrusted to Kyai Cholil by his parents. During his stay, he 
showed braveness and intelligence, an attitude which would benefit his 
future career in many areas of  society. In the revolutionary era, Sochib 
37 Else Ensering, “Banten in Times of  Revolution,” Archipel, Volume 50: Banten 
Histoire d`une région, 1995, p. 149. 
38 Ian Douglas Wilson, “The Politics of  Inner Power: The Practice of  Pencak 
Silat in West Java,” PhD Thesis (Perth: Murdoch University, 2003), pp. 257-258 and 
Okamoto Masaaki, “Local Politics in Decentralised Indonesia: the Governor General 
of  Banten Province,” IIAS Newsletter, No. 34, July 2004, p. 23. 
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went to Pesantren Cadasari, under the guidance of  Kyai Icot. Shortly after 
his acceptance to that pesantren, he joined Hisbullah, a guerrilla warfare 
unit, whose commanders were Kyai Abdullah and Ayip Samin. After the 
revolutionary period came to an end, he embarked upon a more serious 
working life in 1967 (after a couple of  years dealing with a number of  
small businesses) by providing logistical support to the Kodam Siliwangi. 
Two years later he founded a construction company, PT Sinar Ciomas 
Raya, which frequently won government tenders for road and market 
construction projects. His involvement spread to the Krakatau Steel State 
Company, and to tourism and real estate, while holding key positions in 
associations, such as the Regional and Central Chambers of  Commerce 
and Trade (Kadin) and the Indonesian National Contractors’ Association 
(Gapensi), putting his men on their local executive committees.39
The position of  Sochib in the PPPSBBI as chairman is the peak of  
his vertical mobility. That he was a kepala kuli (chief  labourer) and then 
gained a more respectable status by becoming an entrepreneur showed 
this mobility. After he had reached the top, he moved horizontally, 
increasing his social mobility. Even though PPPSBBI is not a wing 
organization of  Golkar, the organization was essential in the political 
context of  Golkar. Golkar was a crucial and strategic element for Sochib 
expanding his horizontal mobility. As a man with power, through Golkar 
he had a wide sphere to increase his political access. To strengthen his 
domination in Golkar, he placed jawara as cadres in the organization 
with the banyan tree as its symbol. These cadres held several important 
positions at the district and municipal levels. Apparently, those who had 
had experience as local officials were favoured by him. However, to 
be actively engaged in Golkar was not his choice in career, although in 
reality he was a member of  the advisory board. For Sochib, Golkar was 
an instrument to expand and secure his business, not mainly a tool to 
obtain political power.40 Therefore, through Kadin and Gapensi, Sochib 
could control the companies operating in Banten, due to the fact that 
certifications from Kadin and Gapensi were necessary for government 
39 Okamoto Masaaki, Local Politics in Decentralised Indonesia, p. 23 and Khatib 
Mansur, Profil Haji Tubagus Chasan Sochib beserta Komentar 100 Tokoh Masyarakat Seputar 
Pendekar Banten (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara Utama, 2000), pp. 79-82.
40 H. S. Suhaedi, “Jawara Banten: Kajian Sosial-Historis tentang Mobilitas Sosial 
Jawara,” MA Thesis (Depok, Universitas Indonesia, 2006), p. 132.
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procurement. Sochib utilized this to coordinate projects in Banten and 
the coordination brought him more money. Another side to this situation 
is that it led jawara under his control to become his sub-contractors and 
share in his profits.41
The PPPSBBI was the first organization through which he spread 
his power in the political constellation, and this political constellation then 
became the vehicle for introducing him to a bigger business world than 
he had moved in before. One of  the main purposes of  the establishment 
of  the PPPSBBI was to channel the aspirations of  jawara away from self-
interest and criminality towards more ‘constructive’ activities, contributing 
to the New Order`s program of  social and economic development. 
Encompassing over 70 perguruan and debus groups, by the mid-1990s 
the organization claimed a membership of  170,000. In the words of  
Sochib, “in the past jawara only fought for themselves, their group or 
tribe, however via the PPPSBBI together we fight for the nation and the 
state”. Commonly known as jawara pembangunan (development jawara), 
they worked to ensure Golkar’s supremacy. Taking advantage of  the long-
standing influence of  jawara in village life, Golkar, through General Ali 
Murtopo, utilized PPPSBBI to secure support for the party in Banten. In 
addition, as the general chairman of  the pendekar42 organization and one 
of  the executive committee members of  Satkar Ulama (Satuan Karya 
Ulama-the Ulama Work Squad), Sochib could act as a bridge between the 
military, bureaucracy and Golkar, as well as the informal world of  Banten.43
Nevertheless, Sochib’s activities are not limited to jawara and 
the business world. One of  the founders of  two private universities, 
Universitas Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa (Untirta)44 and Sekolah Tinggi 
Agama Islam Syekh Mansyur (Staisman), and of  the Banten Museum, he 
remains the head of  the Serang branch of  Generation 45. He has become 
41 Okamoto Masaaki, Local Politics in Decentralised Indonesia, p. 23.
42 In order to avoid the negative image that had come to be associated with 
the term jawara, it was replaced with ‘pendekar`. See Ian Douglas Wilson, The Politics 
of  Inner Power, p. 258. However, Tihami who conducted research on jawara in 1992 
did not agree with the term pendekar, due to the non-originality of  the word pendekar 
in Bantenese languages. See the interview with Tihami in Khatib Mansur, Profil Haji 
Tubagus Chasan Sochib, p. 268.
43 Ian Douglas Wilson, The Politics of  Inner Power, p. 258
44 Not long after Banten residency became Banten province in 2000, the uni-
versity became a state university.
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powerful in all aspects of  Bantenese life; thus outsiders appointed as top 
bureaucrats rely on him and his networks as a bridge to the Bantenese 
world.45
Another prominent jawara figure in Bantenese society is Maman 
Rizal. Like many other jawara, after mastering martial arts, he went 
to Jakarta to find better opportunities for his livelihood. In 1967, he 
began his political career by entering Sekber Golkar and later, in 1970, 
joined the MKGR (Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong-The 
Mutual Assistance Families Society), a wing of  Golkar. After returning 
to Banten, he became a member of  the Pandeglang branch of  Golkar. 
In Pandeglang he was appointed Ketua Divisi Pemenangan Pemilu dan 
Pengkaderan (the Head of  Winning the General Election and Forming 
of  Cadres Division or simply the Success Team) in 1987-1988. His wide 
network, encompassing other jawara with many followers, was a basic 
reason for him to hold several important positions in Golkar. Therefore, 
his influence was seen as an essential factor for his position in Golkar. 
In addition, he also served as treasurer of  MKGR from 1975 until 1987. 
His political career in Golkar gradually improved with his appointment 
as treasurer of  the Serang branch of  Golkar, from 1988-2000. For Rizal, 
Golkar had political and economical benefits that formed a structural 
base for broadening his power. As an entrepreneur, he has become 
involved in many government-financed projects. Meanwhile, in the jawara 
world, he is now a leading figure in the Kebudayaan Seni Tari dan Silat 
Indonesia Tjimande Tari Kolot Kebon Djeruk Hilir (Kesti TTKKDH-
the Indonesian Dancing and Martial Arts Tjimande Tari Kolot Kebon 
Djeruk Hilir Association).46 This organization is widely known among 
the Bantenese, and thus facilitates spreading the organization to villages. 
Consequently, Kesti TTKKDH contributed to the victories of  Golkar 
during the New Order era’s general elections. Golkar, however, rendered 
a service bestowing members of  the organization positions in the local 
parliament, as well as conferring big favours on them to help them 
become successful entrepreneurs. Like Sochib, the economic aspect was 
45 Okamoto Masaaki, “Local Politics in Decentralised Indonesia”, p. 23 and H. 
S. Suhaedi, Jawara Banten, p. 135.
46 This organization was established in 1952 and has approximately 10 million 
loose members all over the country. It is an umbrella organization which covers all 
Cimande martial arts schools.
Strongmen and Religious Leaders in Java
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2011 M/1432 H 173
a main reason behind his activities.47
In Cilegon the most prominent kyai who is also well known for 
having jawara attributes is K.H. Syafiq Latify, a kyai from pesantren Al-
Jauharotun Naqiyyah. His reputation has expanded to Serang, Pandeglang 
and Lebak since he is frequently invited to give pengajian (religious 
gatherings) outside his hometown. It is customary in many regions in 
Indonesia where religious elements are highly regarded that government 
officials and entrepreneurs pay a visit - sowan-meminta petunjuk/asking 
guidance on various matters - to religious leaders. This kyai-jawara is 
one of  the most visited kyai in Cilegon, as well as in Banten province.48
Latify is a member of  Dewan Syuro PKB (Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa-the National Awakening Party). Through his influence, his son, 
H. Iskandar became head of  the Cilegon branch of  PKB. His other son, 
H. Ulfi, was installed as the branch manager of  Ramayana Department 
Store - a leading chain store in Indonesia - utilizing his power. Numerous 
entrepreneurs of  entertainment centres give upeti - japrem/illegal rent - to 
him for the security of  their businesses. The local police are aware of  
this, but because of  his great influence, the police seem to be indisposed 
to have words with him.49
Another major jawara in Cilegon is Abah Mustofa. He holds the 
position as the head of  security for Kawasan Industri Cilegon (Cilegon 
Industrial Centre). His influence goes even further. He also controls other 
strategic places, ranging from entertainment centres to public beaches.50 
The authorities are aware of  these conditions, but instead of  confronting 
the jawara, the authorities employ jawara`s services to collect retributions.
These four examples of  prominent jawara and their companies 
show us that jawara to a large extent have held important roles in colouring 
the socio-political aspects of  Bantenese life. Furthermore, despite their 
dependence on the central government, regional governments were 
relatively powerful in terms of  local administration because they offered 
employment and channelled government funds. This facilitated the 
47 H. S. Suhaedi, Jawara Banten, p. 137-140.
48 Oji Armuji, “Konfigurasi Kekuasaan Elit Lokal: Dinamika Ulama, Jawara dan 
Penguasa di Kota Cilegon (Masa Orde Baru, Masa Transisi, dan Pasca 2000),” MA Thesis 
(Yogyakarta, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2004), p. 109.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid, p. 110.
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reproduction of  patrimonial patterns of  rule at the local level, especially 
in Banten. Even though jawara as the local elite had access to central state 
agencies, they also relied on local constituencies that were mobilized 
through ethnic loyalties.
Patron-client relationship between jawara and the state is also 
accurately illustrated here:
“Even though our operations are not official, actually we obtain this 
power from the authorities (orang-orang di atas). What we do is no more 
than our “obliged responsibility” with sufficient material rewards in 
exchange. We also carry out “special orders” (pesanan-pesanan khusus) that 
require the masses and forcing power towards other parties. The ties are 
not comprehensibly arranged, except with sides who can assure great 
benefits. We consider it as more appropriate than being robbers, thieves 
or pickpockets (Apang, a jawara whose territory is in Anyer beach).51
The relationship between authorities and jawara depends on mutual 
understanding, especially in economic sectors, although during general 
elections political considerations of  this mutual understanding are more 
noticeable. In many aspects, jawara become shields and protectors of  
entrepreneurs’ businesses. In exchange, owners are “obliged” to fulfil 
jawara`s wishes, providing them with funds (japrem-jatah preman). This well 
illustrates what we know as perdekkingan/perbekkingan - the backing system.
Muhit, another jawara in the shopping district of  Cilegon underlines 
the similar importance:
“We do not collect retributions as much as we like. As a matter of  fact, 
it is the authorities who give us conviction to arrange and be responsible 
in safekeeping matters. Our duty is only performing the commitment we 
make with the authorities. We give the results from the contributions and 
only take a little as our wage.”52
Apang and Muhit, unlike the four prominent jawara I mentioned 
earlier, are not easy to distinguish with preman. As jawara gedeh, the four 
figures do not actually resemble the preman characteristics. They are not 
petty thieves. Even though their operations, especially in Era Reformasi, 
have been portrayed as small kings who have transformed themselves 
into powerful local oligarchs through illicit means, they never personally 
51 Ibid, p. 141.
52 Ibid, p. 138.
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use their otot (physical strength) to run their business. They mostly use 
threatening orders and intimidations. Their sangar (spooky) and cruel 
reputation was gained when they were still young and strong in physical 
sense. More importantly, they have placed themselves as power brokers, 
bridging the state and the underworld. Apang and Muhit and other jawara 
teri are under their command. If  Apang and Muhit are the enforcers in the 
lower level, such as collecting money from angkot (public transportation 
means) drivers in their territory, these four jawara are the enforcers of  the 
enforcers. It is their business to deal with the authorities in determining 
which areas belong to whom. Apang and Muhit may fit the criteria of  
jawara-like as Barker has suggested, but in my view, he does not reflect the 
type of  jawara Banten, but closer to the preman. Thus, the jawara version 
of  Barker is not comparable to the four jawara gedeh in Banten.53
The fall of  Suharto in 1998 led to changes in the jawara world. 
Masaaki has emphasized the significance of  jawara roles in Pilkada 
Banten 2006 - the 2006 Direct Election of  Governor of  Banten. In 
bringing about the victory of  Ratu Atut Chosiyah, jawara groups under 
the leadership of  Sochib made use of  various means to bring this jawara-
like strong minded and confident woman to become the first female 
governor of  Banten. The various methods ranged from publicizing the 
results of  two polls conducted by Lembaga Survei Indonesia (Indonesian 
Survey Institute) and Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (Indonesian Survey 
Circle), to intervening in Golkar`s regional convention on 2 July 2006 as 
well as performing the same actions in PDI-P`s special regional working 
meeting on 5 April 2006.54 They also capitalized on voters’ materialism,55 
utilizing PPPSBBI and Badan Pembina Potensi Keluarga Besar Banten 
(BPPKB-the Agency to Develop the Potentialities of  the Bantenese), and 
co-opted young intellectuals, such as activists from Himpunan Mahasiswa 
Islam (HMI-Islamic Students’ Association), Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam 
53 See Barker`s description about jawara in Joshua Barker, “Surveillance and Ter-
ritoriality in Bandung”, in Vicente L. Rafael (ed.), Figures of  Criminality in Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Colonial Vietnam (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell 
University, 1999), pp. 119-122. 
54 The result is that Atut became the sole candidate for the governor seat from 
the two major parties.
55 Ranging from jual-beli suara/sell-buy votes before the election day until execut-
ing serangan fajar-dawn attack/the buying of  votes at dawn on the election day
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Indonesia (PMII-Indonesian Islam Student Movement) and Komite 
Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (KNPI-National Committee for Indonesian 
Youth).56 The last strategy actually mirrored the tactics that Golkar used 
during the Suharto regime in gaining victories during general elections.
D. Strongmen and Religious Leaders: Contesting a Complex 
Relationship57
It seems that banditry was prevalent in Java because mostly as 
peasant protest. Banditry has even been identified as the simplest form of  
rebellion due to the difficulty it causes for the authorities.58 In peasant`s 
protest, the role of  informal leaders cannot be neglected. Religious 
leaders, such as kyai in pesantren or guru (religious teachers) often assume 
political leadership. They were extensively believed to posses mystical 
attributes and magical abilities that gave them charismatic power and a 
high social standing in society. Most bandits in Banten, who had been 
farmers before becoming robbers, usually learnt (berguru) ilmu - literally 
knowledge, though it can mean magical science or martial arts - in 
pesantren or other religious institutions, not only for religious ilmu, but 
undoubtedly also for ilmu kebal (invulnerability). Kyai had to be leaders 
of  people whom the Dutch and later the Islamic modernist movement 
disliked, because they led them in a direction they considered narrow and 
conservative.59 We have to remember that in the course of  few decades, 
in Banten, there was an intensification of  fanaticism in pesantren circles 
and a hostile and aggressive attitude came to be ingrained into the santri 
(pupils of  pesantren) towards both foreigners and the priyayi (aristocracies).60 
However, it did not automatically turn the foreigners and nobles into 
victims. Most victims were simply farmers. Like Blok has suggested, 
bandits usually lived close to their victims. In fact, some of  them lived 
56 Okamoto Masaaki and Abdul Hamid, “Jawara in Power, 1999-2007,” Indonesia 
86, October 2008, pp. 126-135.
57 Some parts of  this section appear in my MA Thesis.
58 Anton Blok, “Bandits and Boundaries: Robber Bands and Secret Societies on 
the Dutch Frontier (1730-1778,)” in Anton Blok (ed.), Honour and Violence (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2001), p. 29. 
59 Michael C. Williams, Communism, Religion and Revolt in Banten, pp. 57-58.
60 Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants’ Revolt of  Banten, pp. 154-157.
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in the same village and some were even close neighbours.61 Bandits 
directed their actions against property and people. Forms of  violence 
were embodied and were common. Even if  bandits acted against the rich, 
they did not give their booty to the poor. One of  the most legendary 
bandit figures in colonial Java, the notorious Pitung, operated in Batavia 
and was romantically depicted as the Indonesian Robin Hood, a hero 
struggling against the corrupt coalition between the local aristocracies 
and the Dutch administration. In reality, he was no more than a common 
robber, an outlaw, as I mentioned before. After his death, he in fact 
became more famous as stories, ballads and lenong performances - popular 
traditional plays in Jakarta - have passed down his tales. However, no 
evidence has been found that Pitung distributed his loot to the poor.62 
The Hobsbawm`s romanticized social bandits were far from reality.
Even though bands of  robbers could be very violent, they were 
inclined to use non-violent methods in their operation. Violent actions 
appeared if  there was no other way to avoid it. They preferred to use 
several kinds of  mantra and other variants of  magical-mystics to cast deep 
sleep on their victims (aji sirep). Several mantras to shed sleep existed, but 
most primbon - Javanese sources of  supra-natural knowledge - gave the 
impression that ilmu begananda was thought to be the most effective one. 
Cautious thieves also complied with spirits, particularly ancestral spirits, 
guardian spirits and those spirits believed to watch over certain days of  
the week. The leaders were usually thought to be endowed with mystifying 
powers, with followers having a strong conviction that their leaders were 
really able to emanate magical powers. They were also equipped with 
jimat (amulet, charm), some of  those came from religious guru, to reject 
bad luck and evil spirits directed at them.63
The idea of  charisma is well-known in Indonesian society. It was 
not only the religious elites who were assumed to possess charismatic 
power, but also underworld leaders. Leader-follower relations in bands 
of  robbers mirrored those of  guru-murid (teachers-disciples) in religious 
circles of  the pesantren or tarekat world, allowing the leaders to enhance 
61 Anton Blok, Bandits and Boundaries, p. 33.
62 Margreet van Till, “In Search of  Si Pitung”.
63 P. M. van Wulfften Palthe, Psychological Aspects of  the Indonesian Problem (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 1949), pp. 27-28; Suhartono, Bandit-bandit Pedesaan, p. 102; and George Quinn, 
“The Javanese Science of  Burglary,” RIMA, 9, 1, January-June 1975, pp. 47-48.
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their power. Bandit chiefs usually possessed jimat which provided them 
with invulnerability and invisibility through ziarah (pilgrimages) to holy 
graves or holy places, such as gunung keramat (sacred mountain), huge 
and old trees or big stones. Ziarah to those sites was also thought to 
indicate the time when robberies may be committed or the methods to 
execute the burglary. Due to the charisma possessed by the leaders, the 
followers became loyal and obedient to them. A benggol, (a leader of  a 
band of  robbers) in rural Java frequently led his gang until he was too 
old to be in charge of  his band or until he died.
One of  the most common relations between strongmen and 
religious leaders is the fact that jago might learn pencak silat (martial arts) 
with a certain guru. It is also possible that they knew a few simple Arabic 
words. In colonial Pekalongan, there were many kyai in the rural areas 
who were sakti and were able to transfer the ilmu, reflecting the strong 
magic-religious elements in rural Islam.64 Lenggaong, a jago-like group 
in Pekalongan, Brebes and Tegal were deeply involved in the rural 
revolution in October 1945. They were to a large degree tied to Islam.65 
Elsewhere, militia groups in the Greater Batavia area also mastered silat 
skills, including ilmu kanuragan (invulnerability). Unlike common jago who 
were not dukun, these revolutionaries could also create jimat with the 
same amount of  kesaktian.66
Meanwhile, in religious circles of  Java, the additional economic 
benefit of  some villagers facilitated kyai in financing their pesantren. 
Kyai and other religious figures, such as guru ngaji (teacher of  Quran 
reciting), imam (leader of  prayer), juru kunci (caretaker in a graveyard), 
merbot (gatekeeper of  mosque), modin (muezzin), and naib (sub-district 
pangulu), in short, those who were involved in arranging the religious 
life in villages, including in maintaining pesantren, appeared to hold a 
higher position among village inhabitants. They were needed especially 
during ritualistic festivities, such as kenduri to commemorate the dead 
and slametan. Moreover, some kyai, besides showing their capacity as men 
of  learning in Islam, also performed mystical Islam, such as predicting 
the future, healing people’s illnesses and giving martial arts lessons. The 
64 Anthony Edward Lucas, “The Bamboo Spear Pierces the Payung”, pp. 37-38.
65 Ibid, p. 164.
66 Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries, p. 20.
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supernatural powers, drawn from mystical Islam, were indeed important 
attributes to develop power and authority relations. Because of  these 
abilities, many jago visited kyai and asked for guidance. This high standing 
of  kyai was found in nineteenth century Java, as well as in other places 
in the Netherlands Indies.
Religious leaders in Java gradually reinforced their status among the 
local population. After the East Indies were placed under the authority of  
Governor-General Herman Willem Daendels in 1808, he reorganized the 
administration on the orders of  King Louis Napoleon, the ruler of  the 
newly established Kingdom of  Holland.67 Under pressure from the Dutch 
colonial administration, the local elite were slowly incorporated into the 
Dutch colonial administration during the nineteenth century. For religious 
figures and many villagers, it meant that the elite also allied themselves 
with the infidel power of  the Dutch. As a result, religious leaders, along 
with villagers experienced disappointment and dissatisfaction since they 
had viewed the elite as autonomous, ideal and influential leaders. The 
people then searched for others who might be able to give guidance for 
achieving harmony in life. In fact, the earlier local elite had enjoyed good 
relations with prominent religious figures since they were not willing to 
acknowledge the authority of  rulers recognised by VOC. They turned 
to religion in order to preserve their high place in society. This situation 
changed in the nineteenth century when they became a mere tool of  the 
colonial bureaucracy.
However, people did not like it when their leaders were integrated 
into the colonial administration. Unlike the local elites, the religious 
figures, such as kyai succeeded in preserving their independence. Villagers 
gradually turned to religious figures. This does not mean that they 
occupied the central position among villagers after Daendels came into 
power. Instead, they became central local leaders in religious, spiritual 
and limited social matters. The decline of  the local elite’s legal leadership 
had a direct consequence: this led the ulama to reinforce their position 
in society. At relatively the same time, jago figures also experienced the 
same situation. The changing pattern of  the local hierarchy due to the 
Dutch colonial government in Java can be seen as the main factor in 
67 Ota Atsushi, Changes of  Regime and Social Dynamics in West Java: Society, State and 
the Outer World of  Banten 1750-1830 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), p. 143.
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strengthening the position of  the ulama as religious leaders and jago as 
feared and respected informal leaders.
In Banten, jawara in the vast network of  pesantren were influential 
in the spread of  martial arts. Perhaps martial arts in Banten are closely 
intertwined with the life of  tarekat. In some cases jawara joined tarekat as 
part of  a sincere spiritual quest. Nevertheless, more commonly tarekat 
and the techniques that they were taught were means toward obtaining 
the various kinds of  esoteric knowledge that were considered essential 
for success as jawara. Similarly, some martial arts teachers conducted 
tarekat type communal devotions.68
Ulama and jawara were co-opted into the political machines of  
Golkar. The recognition of  ulama by the governing party can be seen in 
the establishment of  Satkar Ulama in 1971, while jawara were organised 
into Satkar Pendekar (Satuan Karya Pendekar-the Martial Art Work 
Squad) in 1972. By entering the state and adjusting to the new atmosphere 
of  the political situation, they created new positions where they gradually 
expanded their power, status and wealth.
Jawara were the pupils of  kyai. Kyai in Banten not only taught Islamic 
religious learning, but also gave martial arts as one of  the lessons. Pupils 
who were more talented in practising martial arts became known as 
jawara. Even though they left the pesantren after they graduated, they still 
considered the kyai as their teachers. Therefore, to oppose the kyai was a 
serious breach of  etiquette, with both social and spiritual consequences, 
and expulsion from pesantren was a serious form of  social ostracism. On 
a spiritual level, a rebellious pupil ran the risk of  kawalat (accursed and 
therefore struck down by calamity).69 Perhaps that is why a considerable 
number of  jawara believed that they are the khadam (servant) of  kyai.
The close relationship between jawara and ulama was crucial 
throughout the late nineteenth century, when revolts against the Dutch 
colonial government erupted throughout Banten, and again during the 
68 Martin van Bruinessen, “Shari’a court, tarekat and pesantren: Religious Institu-
tions in the Banten Sultanate,” Archipel, Volume 50, Banten Histoire d`une région, 1995, 
pp. 187-191.
69 M. A. Tihami, “Kyai dan Jawara di Banten: Studi tentang Agama, Magi, dan 
Kepemimpinan di Desa Pasanggrahan Serang, Banten,” MA Thesis (Depok: Universitas 
Indonesia, 1992), pp. 99-100 and Ian Douglas Wilson, “The Politics of  Inner Power”, 
p. 246.
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struggle for independence. Both were central figures in village life. The 
relationship between them was at times troubled, as jawara, to a large 
extent represented pre-Islamic traditions sometimes considered to be 
at odds with Islam.70 Between them, there were also intermediaries 
known as ulama jawara. This term could be applied either to jawara who 
had established themselves as religious teachers, or to ulama who had 
mastered martial arts. In either case such figures played an important 
role as mediating cultural brokers.71
Jawara played roles mainly with leadership aspects, such as becoming 
jaro (lurah-village head), jagakersa (penjaga keamanan desa-village security), 
martial arts teachers, and even teachers of  magic.72 The jaro figures that 
first appeared during the reign of  the Sultanate still existed in recent days. 
Certainly, during the New Order Era, these figures were well known for 
their leadership in mobilizing local villagers to vote for the ruling party 
in general elections. Jawara also became martial arts teachers as well as 
teachers of  magic. Initially, these were the most obvious characteristics 
of  jawara. Within jawara culture there is also a differentiation between 
‘black magic’ and ‘white magic’ jawara. Those who traced their lineage 
to past jawara and sought to continue it through their own offspring 
were ‘white’, whereas those with no identifiable lineage were ‘black’. The 
existence of  a lineage was crucial to the legitimization of  a jawara within 
his community. The lineage acted as a type of  ‘contract’ of  accountability 
to pre-established norms. The linking thread between the two types of  
jawara was the possession of  supernatural power. In addition, the role of  
jawara which is associated with magic is as debus73players. It is interesting 
to note that many jawara often took some verses from Quran, and 
thus they believed that the power they had originally came from kyai.74 
70 Ian Douglas Wilson, “The Politics of  Inner Power”, p. 249.
71 Sunatra,“Integrasi dan Konflik: Kedudukan Politik Ulama-Jawara dalam Bu-
daya Politik Lokal: Studi Kasus Kepemimpinan Informal Pedesaan di Banten Selatan,” 
PhD Thesis (Bandung: Universitas Padjadjaran, 1997), p. 138. 
72 Hudaeri, “Tasbih dan Golok,” unpublished article for the Ministry of  Religious 
Affairs, 2002, p. 44.
73 A traditional performance that its main function is to furnish proof  of  in-
vulnerability. See, for instance J. Vredenbregt, “Dabus in West Java,” BKI 129 (1973), 
No. 2/3, pp. 302-320.
74 Hudaeri, “Tasbih dan Golok”, pp. 44-53; Ian Douglas Wilson, The Politics of  
Inner Power, p. 245; and Sunatra, Integrasi dan Konflik, pp. 100-101.
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Nonetheless, I argue that this view is somewhat misleading since both a 
considerable number of  ‘white’ and ‘black’ jawara have used black magic 
up to the present day.
Both ulama and jawara are subcultures of  the complete culture 
which makes up Bantenese culture. Ulama are well known as public 
figures in the socio-religious aspect, while jawara deal mainly with society 
in the social institutions of  the Bantenese. Even though ulama and jawara 
played different roles during the New Order era, the integration between 
them through PPPSBBI and Satkar Ulama led them to be considered as 
belonging to the social elite within Bantenese society.75
Ulama and jawara are the source of  informal traditional leadership, 
particularly in villages. Ulama represent the leadership in knowledge, while 
jawara represent the leadership with regard to bravery and physic-magical 
power. This kind of  leadership cannot be neglected, and in fact it can 
be traced back to the Sultanate period. The long history of  rebellions in 
Banten led the Bantenese to possess a unique character, characterized in 
society mainly by ulama and jawara. Therefore, the relationship between 
ulama and jawara has two special characteristics: the integrative and the 
disintegrative characteristic.
In the integrative social relationship, jawara need ulama as religious 
figures as well as for magical power. Ulama are seen as the most important 
legitimizing tool in jawara’s leadership. Without support from ulama, 
jawara will have difficulty in becoming informal leaders. In societies like 
the Bantenese, which consider religion as guidance, approval from ulama 
will lead society in its choice of  leaders. Therefore, jawara always need 
support from ulama if  they want to become leaders.
Jawara are also dependent on ulama in issues of  magical sources. It 
is widely believed in Banten that ulama possess ‘Islamic magic’ and that 
jawara gain their fighting skills from ulama. Hence, many jawara consider 
themselves as servants of  ulama. On the other hand, ulama have several 
interests in jawara, mainly their physical and material support. Jawara 
who ask for martial arts and magic from ulama will surely give material 
compensation, such as money or valuable gifts, which are known as 
salawat. Giving salawat to ulama is meant as payment for an ulama’s blessing 
75 Edi S. Ekadjati, Kebudayaan Sunda: Suatu Pendekatan Sejarah (Jakarta: Pustaka 
Jaya, 1995), p. 224 and Sunatra, Integrasi dan Konflik, p. 131.
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given to jawara.76
I argue that this unique relationship between ulama and jawara 
was evident during the New Order era. Golkar utilized its affiliated 
associations, such as the Indonesian Renewal Youth Organisation 
(AMPI-Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia), National Committee 
for Indonesian Youth (KNPI-Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia) and 
Siliwangi Youth (AMS-Angkatan Muda Siliwangi) to secure support for 
the party. In Banten, where local politics was dominated by ulama and 
jawara, they made use of  Satkar Ulama77 and PPPSBBI to gain victories. In 
this respect Golkar mirrored the tactics used by the PKI. They found out 
that the feelings of  the Bantenese towards ulama were those of  respect, 
while towards jawara they were a mixture of  fear and respect. Therefore, 
to a large extent the integration between ulama-jawara and the people could 
happen due to the support of  almost all of  the elements in Banten who 
believed in the power of  the two social groups, and respected them up 
to recent days, as well.
E. Conclusion
Religious leaders in Indonesia respond in various ways to ideological 
and political developments partially because in each area they relate to 
localized political situations. In present Indonesia, religious life has not 
been integrated into the political state. Therefore, it is not surprising to 
note that a considerable number of  religious leaders in Indonesia, at least 
in the modern period, are not affiliated with bureaucracy. However, they 
continue to occupy important roles in Indonesia.
In colonial Java, ulama emerged as important religious leaders as 
well as the people’s leaders due to the Dutch colonial administration and 
the integration of  the local secular elite into the foreign power. The desire 
of  many villagers for leaders who provided their philosophical base in 
their daily life was manifested in the relationship between the people 
and influential leaders who successfully maintained their independence. 
Religious leaders were seen as people’s leaders in almost all aspects of  
76 M. A. Tihami, “Kyai dan Jawara di Banten”, p. 103.
77 For the involvement of  Mathla`ul Anwar, one of  the largest Muslim mass-
based organizations in Indonesia, in Golkar, see Didin Nurul Rosidin, “From Kampung 
to Kota: a Study of  the Transformation of  Mathla`ul Anwar 1916-1998”, PhD Thesis 
(Leiden: Leiden University, 2007).
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villager life.
In the traditional life of  Java and Banten, extraordinary people such 
as kyai are needed to serve as the ultimate leader. The priyayi who were 
seen as mere officials of  a foreign administration and their successors 
who, after independence, were perceived as agents of  a secular state, 
are not the ideal propagators and guardians of  Quran and other written 
materials. Thus, the intellectual ability to understand these sources has to 
belong to the right people. In this respect, the Javanese gradually turned 
to religious figures and the decline of  the local elite leadership led the 
ulama to strengthen their position in the society.
In Banten, Satkar Ulama, together with jawara, can also be seen 
as a determining factor in the process of  local politics, where their 
influence went far beyond that of  any other elements. The integration 
of  ulama-jawara and the people led Golkar to achieve victories in Banten. 
In Banten, ulama and jawara were both respected and feared figures 
because of  their physic-magical power, and together they formed a 
unique combination supporting the New Order regime in Banten. This 
combination was strengthened by the support of  local society among 
whom ulama were well-known figures in the socio-religious aspect, while 
jawara were considered by society as a social group within the Bantenese 
culture. Thus the integration of  these two groups was able to exist for 
years, even up to the present day.
Furthermore, jago and jawara, whether they become power brokers 
or criminals, are outlaws, in the sense that the authorities do not wish 
to touch them. They can make alliances with criminals, but they can 
also cooperate with local administrations. Everything depends on the 
demands. They are needed by local authorities to maintain peace and 
order, but they will almost definitely collaborate with criminals if  there 
are big targets and easy prey. Nevertheless, they mostly make allies 
with local authorities as their means of  livelihood. During the colonial 
period, these local authorities who lost their privileges became their main 
allies. Since there were a significant number of  local authorities who 
lost their privileges, not surprisingly, bands of  these people could grow 
and expand their territory and alliances with local authorities. Certainly, 
to facilitate the coordination between them, these strongmen created 
their own networks. By establishing these loose networks, their position 
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became stronger and complicated and thus created complex conditions 
for colonial authorities. Here we witness that the conditions that made 
these strongmen possible were due to the weak policies of  the colonial 
administration to accommodate the interests of  local and indigenous 
authorities as well as due to the weak law enforcement of  both local and 
colonial administrations. These conditions did not occur all at once, but 
gradually, indicating a tendency that when colonial authorities’ policies 
failed to facilitate indigenous people in creating strong economies and 
and strict laws, illegal and violent practices happen in society.
Unlike jago who slowly lost their influence after Indonesian 
independence, as long as the manifestation of  ‘law and order’ was not 
openly disrupted, jawara have continued their business up to present 
day. In collaboration with and protected by local officials, several jawara 
have succeeded in positioning themselves as elites in social, political 
and economical domains of  the Bantenese, where they have formed 
an unstable system of  internally shifting power relationship which 
challenged the formal structures of  the state. They are what we call the 
shadow state.78 The ongoing state formation, such as democratization 
and decentralization, allows for the emergence of  politically autonomous 
local leaders. This process seems to enable, or—in fact—to maintain a 
number of  deep-rooted social groups which use violence and intimidation 
as the means for reaching their goals. Like the mafia in Sicily, they are 
entrepreneurs of  violence. They are brokers who are in the service of  
the authorities and against the population. They have extensive networks 
that maintain their position in society and the authorities make it possible 
for them to continue their practice of  power.
Defining the relationship between strongmen and religious 
leaders is not an easy task. They have had a complex relationship for 
over a hundred years. During the colonial era, strongmen in Java needed 
religious leaders mostly for fighting skills and magical power. In the New 
Order period in Banten, jawara and religious leaders can also be seen as 
a determining factor in the process of  local politics in Banten, where 
their influence went far beyond that of  any other elements. Era Reformasi 
78 Henk Schulte Nordholt, A Genealogy of  Violence, pp. 39-40 and Syarif  Hidayat, 
“`Shadow State`?: Business and Politics in the Province of  Banten,” in Henk Schulte 
Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds.), Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007).
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has witnessed the growing recognition of  jawara groups in Banten. Even 
though they have been portrayed as small kings who have transformed 
themselves into powerful local oligarchs through illicit means, their 
dynamic relationship with religious leaders is still marked by obedience 
to religious figures and concurrently, contests for power are taking place 
as well.
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